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AT THE WATER’S EDGE: LEGAL PROTECTIONS
AND FUNDING FOR A NEW GENERATION OF
CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES
Claire DeWitte*

PART I: INTRODUCTION
As climate change stimulates a rise in sea level, coastal communities
and islands are experiencing destructive erosion of land and flooding of
habitation.1 As a result, residents of low-lying communities and small
islands are, and will continue to be, displaced due to the gradual, steady
rise of sea level and its associated problems, such as increased
destruction from flooding and other natural disasters.2 Millions of people
will lose their homes and livelihoods, forcing them to seek alternative
shelter within their own country, or cross borders in the hope of finding a
new home and work.3 Climate change displacement is predicted to affect
approximately 200 million people by 2050.4 The enormity of climate
change displacement demands financial resources that vulnerable

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law.
1. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 40821 (S. Soloman et al. eds. 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_
and_data/ar4/wg1/en/contents.html [hereinafter IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I].
2. See NORMAN MYERS WITH JENNIFER KENT, CLIMATE INST., ENVIRONMENTAL
EXODUS: AN EMERGENT CRISIS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 134-39 (1995), available at
http://www.climate.org/PDF/Environmetnal%20Exodus.pdf.
3. See Lisa Friedman, Coming Soon: Mass Migrations Spurred by Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/03/02/02
climatewire-facing-the-specter-of-the-globes-biggest-and-9919.html?scp=1&sq=Coming%20Soon:%20Mass%20Migrations&st=cse.
4. OLI BROWN, MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (Int’l Org. for Migration
Research Series Paper No. 31 2008), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/
migration_climate.pdf.
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populations lack.5 Currently, people displaced by climate change are not
recognized by international law as a group that receives protection and
assistance. In contrast, refugees who flee their countries of nationality
due to persecution on account of, for example, race or religion, gain
internationally recognized status under the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.6 In an effort to fill the void, scholars
have endeavored to redefine “refugee” and “internally displaced persons”
(IDPs) in light of the climate change catalyst, and propose international
funding mechanisms to rectify the negative effects of the mass human
migration. First, I will outline the current state of sea level rise and the
projected displacement in developing low-lying coastal communities and
islands.7 Second, I will analyze new “refugee” and “IDP” definitions and
possible funding mechanisms. Third, I will argue that the Green Climate
Fund, born out of the Copenhagen Accord, is an appropriate funding
mechanism to assist people displaced by climate change; therefore, a
portion of the Green Climate Fund should be allocated specifically
toward mitigating forced displacement due to rising sea level.
PART II: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF LAND
A. Sea Level Rise
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)8 Fourth
Assessment Report states that there are two key causes of global sea
level rise: thermal expansion of oceans (water expands as it warms) and
5. KOKO WARNER, CHARLES EHRHART, ALEX DE SHERBININ, SUSANA ADAMS, &
TRICIA CHAI-ONN, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER: MAPPING THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
ON HUMAN MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT iv (CARE Int’l 2009) available at
http://www.care.org/getinvolved/advocacy/pdfs/Migration_Report.pdf [hereinafter IN
SEARCH OF SHELTER].
6. Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting the Rising Tide: A Proposal for a
Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 357 (2009);
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter
1967 Protocol].
7. Coastal communities and small islands in developing countries receive the focus
because of the regions’ high vulnerability to rise in sea level.
8. IPCC is a scientific body that was established by the United Nations Environment
Programme and the World Meteorological Organization to “provide the world with a
clear scientific view on the current state of climate change and its potential environmental
and socio-economic consequences.” http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm.
IPCC won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. Id.
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the loss of land-based ice due to increased melting.9 From 1993 to 2003,
thermal expansion of oceans and loss of land-based ice are believed to
have equally contributed to the global rise in sea level.10 Studies have
shown that since 1961, “the average temperature of the global ocean has
increased to depths of at least 3,000 meters and that the ocean has been
absorbing more than 80% of the heat added to the climate system. Such
warming causes seawater to expand, contributing to sea level rise.”11
Historically, sea level rise was stable until the nineteenth century.12
During the twentieth century, estimates show that the global sea level
rose at an average rate of 1.7 millimeters annually.13 Since 1993, “sea
level has been rising at a rate of around three millimeters per year,
significantly higher than the average during the previous half century.”14
Sea level is projected to rise at an even faster rate during the twenty-first
century, with an anticipated four millimeters per year by the 2090s.15
B. Areas and Populations of Impact
Global sea level rise is not geographically uniform.16 Some regions
are confronted with rates that are five times the global sea level
average.17 For example, the western Pacific Ocean and eastern Indian
Ocean are experiencing the highest sea level rise, while sea level is
dropping in the eastern Pacific Ocean and western Indian Ocean.18 Lowlying coastal communities and small islands are particularly vulnerable
to rising sea level.19 Coastal communities, which are very susceptible to
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I, supra note 1, at 409.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 409.
Id.
Id.
IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I, supra note 1, at 409.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT ON THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 336 (M.L. Parry et al. eds. 2007) [hereinafter IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP II].
17. “Although regional variability in coastal sea level change had been reported from
tide gauge analyses . . . the global coverage of satellite altimetry provides unambiguous
evidence of non-uniform sea level change in open oceans.” IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP I, supra note 1, at 411.
18. Id. IPCC suggests that the western Pacific and eastern Indian oceans experience
more substantial sea level rise because they are “regions that exhibit large interannual
variability associated with ENSO [El Nino – Southern Oscillation]. . . . These spatial
patterns likely reflect decadal fluctuations rather than long-term trends.” Id.
19. See id. at 408-21.
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extreme storms, experience “increased coastal inundation, erosion and
ecosystem losses” due to rising sea level caused by climate change.20
The IPCC assessment of sea level rise on small islands includes “a
reduction in island size, particularly in the Pacific . . . sea level rise will
exacerbate inundation, erosion, and other coastal hazards, threaten vital
infrastructure,21 settlements and facilities, and thus compromise the
socio-economic well-being of island communities and states.”22 A
gradual rise in sea level also increases the risk of sudden flooding and
vulnerability to catastrophic storms.23 For example, the harsh force of a
tropical storm “will increase as a consequence of higher mean sea level:
higher waves will be capable of reaching the original shoreline (defined
as the shorelines prior to the rise in sea level) and areas further inland
will become exposed to wave action.”24 Moreover, ecosystems that have
served to “dissipate the energy of storms” are threatened by rising sea
level. For example, coastal mangroves, dense forests of interlacing roots,
“offer a form of physical protection to coastal systems and populations
[during storms], are also likely to be affected by [sea level rise].”25
Humans have often considered coastal land ideal for habitat and
settlement.26 A movement toward urbanization is “likely to increase
population densities in low-lying coastal areas; the population living
within thirty kilometers of the coast is estimated to be growing at twice
the global average reflecting coastward migration, and GDP growth in
coastal areas exceeds the national average in many countries.”27 IPCC
predicts “the coastal population could grow from 1.2 billion people (in
1990) to 1.8 to 5.2 billion people by the 2080s, depending on
assumptions about migration.”28 With the increase of coastal population,
20. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 317.
21. Id. at 689. “Island infrastructure tends to predominate in coastal locations. In the
Caribbean and Pacific islands, more than 50% of the population live within 1.5 km of the
shore. Almost without exception, international airports, roads and capital cities in the
small islands of the Indian and Pacific [o]ceans and the Caribbean are sited along the
coast, or on tiny coral islands.” Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 333, 689.
24. NICK BROOKS, ROBERT NICHOLLS, & JIM HALL, WBGU, SEA LEVEL RISE:
COASTAL
IMPACTS
AND
RESPONSES
14,
(2006),
available
at
http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_sn2006_ex03.pdf.
25. Id. at 26.
26. “Population densities in coastal areas are three times the global mean, and it is
estimated that 50% of the world’s population will live within 100 km of the coast by
2030.” Id. at 1.
27. Id.
28. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 317.
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natural coastal landscape has experienced increased agricultural and
industrial use and an “expansion of economic activity, settlements, urban
centres and tourist resorts.”29 High population density on coastal lands
exacerbates the impact of rising sea level. For example, an increase of
human activity on coastlines directly impacts “drainage of coastal
wetlands, deforestation and reclamation, and discharge of sewage,
fertilisers and contaminants into coastal waters”30 and breaks down
traditionally protective ecosystems.31 Rising sea level, high coastal
population, and humans’ increased pressure on coastal ecosystems serve
as a perfect storm to accelerate and swell the number of humans facing
permanent displacement.
A nation’s geographic location and population density are not the
only factors that determine its vulnerability to the negative effects of
rising sea level, particularly human displacement. IPCC stresses that
“[w]hile physical exposure can significantly influence vulnerability for
both human populations and natural systems, a lack of adaptive capacity
is often the most important factor that creates a hotspot of human
vulnerability.”32 Generally, a nation’s adaptive capacity is measured by
the development level of the nation.33 For example, “[d]eveloping
nations may have the political or societal will to protect or relocate
people who live in low-lying coastal zones, but without the necessary
financial and other resources/capacities, their vulnerability is much
greater than that of a developed nation in an identical coastal setting.”34
Due to financial constraints, developing nations can rely less on the
“resilience of systems to the immediate impacts of coastal hazards, for
example the quality of physical infrastructure, the preparedness of
communities, and the ability of a system to recover from damage
associated with coastal hazards.”35 Consequently, developing nations
face the greatest threat of detrimental human displacement due to rising
sea level.
a. The Three Deltas: Ganges-Brahmaputra, Mekong, and Nile
Bangladesh is frequently cited as a “hotspot” for human
displacement caused by rising sea level. Approximately 160 million
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 319.
Id.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 317.
Id.
IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 317.
BROOKS, NICHOLLS, & HALL, supra note 24, at 1.
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people occupy this flat land that sits just above sea level. 36 The Ganges,
Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers form the world’s largest delta, all
within Bangladesh’s borders. The abundance of rivers and deltas
provide many Bangladeshis with their livelihood and natural resources.37
Flooding is not a new phenomenon for Bangladesh; however, “climate
change will accelerate change in this already dynamic environment and
leave millions of Bangladeshis exposed to increased flooding, severe
cyclones, and sea level rise impacts.”38 The IPCC anticipates that with a
one meter rise in sea level, approximately 1,000 square kilometers of
cultivated land and sea product culturing area is likely to become sea
marsh and 5,000 square kilometers of Mekong River delta are projected
to flood.39 Bangladeshis rely mostly on small-scale farming as their
source for food.40 This projection has direct impact on the habitation of
Bangladeshis as “even a relatively moderate 10 or 20 centimeters rise in
sea level could displace millions within the next 15 years.”41
Displacement is not just a prediction; fifteen years ago, “half of Bhola
Island in Bangladesh became permanently flooded, leaving homeless
500,000.”42 To make matters worse, Bangladesh lacks the financial
capabilities and necessary adaptation abilities to effectively minimize the
strains on natural resources as displaced Bangladeshis seek protection
from the looming floods.43 Due to Bangladesh’s “long history of weak
and corrupt governments,” Bangladeshis cannot depend on their
government for political and social protection during the upheaval of
land ownership caused by rising sea level.44

36. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Oct. 19, 2010, 12:01 PM),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html.
37. IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 5, at iv.
38. Id.
39. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 481.
40. Emily Wax, In Flood-Prone Bangladesh, a Future That Floats, WASH. POST, Sep.
27, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/09/26/AR2007092602582.html.
41. Nicki Bennett, Climate Migration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2008, 3:20 PM),
http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/climatemigration/?scp=1&sq=Climate%20Migration&st=cse.
42. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 356.
43. See Wax, supra note 40.
44. “Farmers who lose land in flooding often fight with neighbors over what is left
and who owns what after the floodwaters recede. As a result, land disputes have backed
up the courts in recent years, accounting for 80 percent of Bangladesh’s legal suits, said
Atiq Rahman, executive director of the Bangladesh Center for Advanced Studies and one
of the country’s top climate change experts.” Id.
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Vietnam, home of the Mekong Delta, faces a displacement projection
similar to that of its South Asian neighbor, Bangladesh. A recent report
indicates that approximately one-third of the Mekong Delta could be lost
with a three-foot rise in sea level.45 Effectively, 11% of Vietnam’s
eighty-seven million residents could potentially be displaced by such an
increase in sea level.46 Because Vietnam has low coastal protection, the
region is more likely to be damaged from increased flooding.47 The
Mekong Delta provides half of Vietnam’s rice, 60% of its shrimp
harvest, and 80% of its fruit crop.48 A rise in sea level will not only force
coastal residents to migrate, but will affect the entire nation’s food
production. The government of Vietnam has started to develop plans to
respond to the projected Vietnamese displacement,49 but it faces an uphill
battle. The costs of preventive measures, like building dikes along miles
of the Mekong Delta, can be debilitating to an already struggling
economy. 50
Three major Egyptian cities, Alexandria, Rosetta, and Port Said,
border the Nile Delta. The Nile Delta rivals Bangladesh as one of the
most densely populated regions in the world.51 If sea level rises by fifty
centimeters, IPCC projects over two million people in the Nile Delta
region potentially “abandoning their homes” and a “loss of 214,000
jobs.”52 Taken as a whole, of Egypt’s total population of approximately
eighty-one million people, twelve million people are expected to be
displaced due primarily to rising sea level.53 Alexandria, the second
largest city in Egypt, is at particular risk of infrastructure destruction and

45. Seth Mydans, Vietnam Finds Itself Vulnerable if Sea Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 24,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/world/asia/24delta.html?_r=1&
scp=1&sq=Vietnam%20Finds%20Itself&st=cse.
46. See id.
47. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 485.
48. IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 5, at 15.
49. See Mydans, supra note 45.
50. Id. The rise in sea level and the cost of preventive measures “could slow
Vietnam’s drive to emerge from its postwar poverty and impede its ambitions to become
one of the region’s economic leaders. Once again, this nation, which has spent much of
its history struggling to free itself from foreign domination, finds itself threatened by the
overpowering outside force.” Id.
51. Brown, supra note 4, at 18.
52. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 339.
53. Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st
Century, 357 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY BIOLOGICAL
SCIENCES 609, 611 (2001), available at http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/
content/357/1420/609.full.pdf+html.
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With a population of
displacement due to rising sea level.54
approximately four million, Alexandria is home to 40% of the nation’s
industry and extends along a coastal plain for over sixty-three
kilometers.55 In 1999, M. El Raey of University of Alexandria projected
that 60% of Alexandria’s population and 56% of its industry would be
affected by a 0.25 meter increase in sea level rise.56 Similar to Vietnam,
Egypt strives to implement measures to mitigate the damage of sea level
rise, like beach nourishment and installing hard structures.57 However,
the nation faces the high cost of implementation.58
b. Disappearing Islands: the Maldives and Tuvalu
Low-lying islands anticipate complete envelopment of their land, the
most lasting and detrimental result of the rising water.59 The Maldives
and Tuvalu serve as illuminating examples of projected total land loss of
small island nations. The Maldives is a series of 1,200 atolls in the
Indian Ocean with the highest point of elevation at 2.4 meters above sea
level. Tuvalu is vulnerable to rising sea level as well, with the highest
point just five meters above sea level. Male, the capital of the Maldives,
which is located approximately one kilometer from the coast, may
experience considerable flooding by 2025.60 To try to prevent the
ultimate loss of the Maldivian capital, the government constructed a
three meter high sea wall that surrounds the city. The Maldives lacked
the resources to construct the protective wall, which cost approximately
$63 million, so the government accepted 99% of the needed capital as
aid from the Japanese government.61 If the rise in sea level does not
54. M. El Raey, Kh. Dewidar, & M. El Hattab, Adaptation to the Impacts of Sea Level
Rise in Egypt, 12 Climate Res. 117, 118-19 (1999), available at http://www.intres.com/articles/cr/12/c012p117.pdf.
55. Id. at 118.
56. Id.
57. The following are examples of “coastal nourishment” and “hard structures” that
Egypt has considered in order to combat the rise in sea level along the Delta: 1)
constructing two jetties that are sixty-five meters in length along the west of Alexandria;
2) extending an existing breakwater along the eastern harbor of Alexandria; 3)
transporting desert sand to five Alexandria beaches; and 4) reinforcing a sea wall in Abu
Quir Bay. Id. at 120.
58. Id. at 127.
59. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 349.
60. Id., supra note 6, at 356. In 2008, Male’s population was 103,693.
61. See Nick Bryant, Maldives: Paradise Soon To Be Lost, BBC NEWS, July 28, 2004,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3930765.stm; Andrew Revkin,
Maldives Considers Buying Dry Land if Sea Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, available
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actually cause the total disappearance of the island, the change in sea
level will likely have major impact on commercial fisheries, which serve
as “an important contribution to the GDP of many island states.”62 In an
effort to combat the future loss of land and homes, the Maldives and
Tuvala governments have called on the international community to assist
in preventing their nations from ceasing to exist. 63
PART III: NEW BREED OF DISPLACEMENT
A. Refugee Law
Currently, international law does not grant protection to people
displaced due to rising sea level and other environmental dangers64
caused by climate change.65 In order to receive internationally
recognized refugee status, a displaced person must fulfill the
requirements outlined in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention) and the 1967
Protocol.66 Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual seeking
“refugee” status must meet the definition’s three elements. First, the
term “refugee” applies “to any person who . . . has . . . a well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”67 Second,
the individual must be “outside the country of his nationality.”68 Third,
the individual must be “unable or, owing to such fear, . . . unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or . . . , not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence
as a result of such events, . . . unable or, owing to such fear, . . .
unwilling to return.”69

at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/11/science/earth/11maldives.html?_r=1&scp=4&
sq=Maldives%20and%20Japan&st=cse.
62. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 689.
63. See Webcast: United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, held by
the United Nations (Dec. 7-19, 2009), http://webcast.cop15.dk/kongresse/cop15/
templ/ovw.php?id_kongressmain=1&theme=cop15.
64. Some possible environmental factors that may force displacement other than
rising sea level are drought, lack of potable water, land degradation, and lack of natural
resources.
65. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 357.
66. 1951 Convention, supra note 6, art. 1.
67. Id. art. 1(A)(2).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
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A displaced person will find it difficult to qualify as a “refugee”
under this definition due to the “persecution” and “class” elements of the
definition, thus limiting the number of individuals who successfully find
legal protection in another country. Moreover, qualifying for refugee
status is nearly impossible if the environment is cited as the reason for
displacement, “[u]nless the environmental degradation is a consequence
of an armed conflict or there is a mixture of environmental and political
causes.”70
If refugee status is successfully granted, international legal
protections are bestowed on the refugee in his/her new host country,
including the right to be gainfully employed, receive public education,
and freedom from refoulement “to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”71 Each signatory country to the 1951 Refugee Convention
determines the ceiling of accepted refugees each year.72 Effectively, due
to the 1951 Refugee Convention’s narrow “refugee” definition and
limited host countries’ quotas, people who are displaced because of
climate-induced rising sea level are left without legal protection.73
As our globe faces the escalation of climate change-induced
displacement, the definition of “refugee” is looking like “a product of its
time.”74
The 1951 Refugee Convention was signed during the
aftershocks of World War II and the predominant source of refugees was
war-ravaged Europe.”75 Therefore, “[n]ot surprisingly, the definition that
issued forth from that era reflected Western notions of rights and needs

70. Maria Stavropoulou, Indigenous Peoples Displaced from Their Environment: Is
There Adequate Protection?, 5 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 105, 119 (1994).
71. 1951 Convention, supra note 6, art. 33(1).
72. President Obama, for example, has allotted 80,000 slots for refugees in 2010.
73. But see Jessica Cooper, Article, Environmental Refugees: Meeting Requirements
of the Refugee Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480, 486-87 (1998). Ms. Cooper makes
the compelling argument that:
[E]nvironmental refugees already fit within the 1951 definition. Using examples
of environmental crises to demonstrate that governments are responsible for
environmental degradation and its resulting populations of environmental refugees
. . . government-induced environmental degradation is a form of persecution . . .
[and] environmental refugees meet the “for reasons of” requirement of the refugee
definition, since they are persecuted for reasons of their membership in a social
group of persons who are politically powerless to protect their environment.
Id.
74. Id. at 482.
75. Id.
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extolled after the persecution of the Second World War.”76 The twentyfirst century has brought catalysts of displacement that the original 1951
Refugee Convention drafters could not have anticipated. Recognizing
the projected magnitude of climate change displacement and the lack of
an international convention to mitigate and ease the migration, scholars
have sought to redefine “refugee” in order to incorporate the unique
needs of climate change displacement.
B. Proposals to address climate change displacement – a more precise
definition
Over the last twenty-five years, an increasingly heated academic
debate has focused on possible new definitions for people displaced by
climate change. Initially, much of the discourse was guided by “those
who study . . . the broader class of environmental refugees rather than the
more specific subset of climate change refugees.”77 For example, in
1985, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) produced the
first “environmental refugee” definition: “[t]hose people who have been
forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently,
because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered
by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the
quality of their life.”78 The debate continued as Myers and Kent, in
2005, defined an environmental refugee as persons who can no longer
gain secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of
environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification,
deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages, climate change, and natural
disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and floods.79 This definition

76. Id.
77. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 363.
78. “By ‘environmental disruption’ in this definition is meant any physical, chemical
and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, temporarily
or permanently, unsuitable to support human life.” Id. Professor Robert McLeman of the
University of Ottawa addressed reservations associated with the UNEP’s definition of
environmental refugee when he stated that “most suggested examples involving
environmental refugees, such as Darfur or Rwanda, have also been influenced by other
significant, non-climatic drivers” as well as “deliberate decisions by governments to alter
environmental conditions (such as populations displaced by flooding of areas upstream of
China’s Three Gorges dams).” Robert McLeman, Climate Change Migration, Refugee
Protection, and Adaptive Capacity-Building, 4 MCGILL INT’L J. SUST. DEV. L. & POL’Y 1,
13 (2008).
79. Org. for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 13th Economic Forum, Prague, May
23-27, 2005, Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue 1, (remarks by
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suggests an involuntary decision to relocate when “the general
degradation of a region’s natural environment might lead people to
decide to seek better fortunes elsewhere.”80
Biermann and Boas, in “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a
Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees,” sought to
narrow the definition in order to focus more on climate change as the
causal link between natural disruption and forced migration, as opposed
to general environmental changes. In their view, “climate refugees” are
“people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near
future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural
environment related to at least one of the three impacts of climate
change: sea level rise, extreme weather events, and water scarcity.”81
With continued focus on climate change, in 2009, Docherty and Giannini
proposed a “climate change refugee” definition that covers sudden and
gradual disruptions and “acknowledges aggregate human contributions to
climate change.”82 According to Docherty and Giannini, a “climate
change refugee” is “an individual who is forced to flee his or her home
and to relocate temporarily or permanently across a national boundary as
the result of sudden or gradual environmental disruption that is consistent
with climate change to which humans more likely than not
contributed.”83

Norman
Myers),
available
at
http://www.osce.org/documents/eea/
2005/05/14488_en.pdf.
80. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 364.
81. FRANK BIERMANN & INGRID BOAS, PREPARING FOR A WARMER WORLD: TOWARDS
A GLOBAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM TO PROTECT CLIMATE REFUGEES 8 (Global Governance
Project, Global Governance Working Paper No. 33, 2007), available at
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002952/climate_refugees_globalgovernance_Nov
2007.pdf.
82. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 371.
The recognition of human contribution must work within the parameters of
existing and evolving science. Science cannot currently prove the extent to which
humans contributed to a specific event, but it can determine the likelihood that
they contributed to a type of disruption. For example, according to the IPCC, the
likelihood of human contribution ranges from more likely than not (greater than
fifty percent) for droughts to very likely (more than ninety percent) for temperature
increases and sea-level rise. The proposed climate change refugee definition
adopts the IPCC’s “more likely than not” standard in order to encompass the range
of environmental disruptions most commonly associated with climate change and
related displacement.
Id.
83. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 361.

2010]

At the Water’s Edge

223

C. Internally Displaced Persons Law
The rights and bestowed protections of people who are internally
displaced by rising sea level has received less focus than people who
cross borders. However, academics predict that “[m]ost refugees may
stay in their countries and regions, especially in the case of coastal
erosion and sea level rise. For example, Christian Aid expects that only
five million refugees will cross international borders.”84 Partly due to
limited financial resources and support, many displaced persons will not
be able to migrate great distances.85 Docherty and Giannini argue that
IDPs should be left out of the climate change refugee definition in order
to reflect the 1951 Refugee Convention’s current distinction between
refugees and IDPs, as well as recognizing that “host states, to which
refugees flee, are more likely to accept outside assistance than are home
states, which may not want interference from the international
community.”86 In contrast, other academics, like Biermann and Boas,
embrace IDPs in their environmental or climate change refugee
definitions, arguing that there should not be different legal status or
protection applied “depending on whether the victims of climate change
have crossed a border.”87
If IDPs are excluded from the proposed climate change refugee
definitions intended to protect people displaced due to rising sea level,
IDPs will not find sufficient protection under current IDP law. As
Stephen Castles points out in a United Nations Refugee Agency report,
“[t]here is no legal or institutional regime specifically designed to protect
IDPs.”88 Because of the gap in international law, “unless [an IDP’s] state
consents, the internally displaced also receives no assistance from the
international community. Thus, internally displaced persons must seek
aid from their own state, and, under existing international law, the
internally displaced largely remain an internal matter for that state to
address.”89 Striving to create a mandate that would provide protection
for IDPs, the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 14.
IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 5, at iv.
Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 369.
BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 8.
STEPHEN CASTLES, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION: MAKING SENSE OF THE DEBATE 9
(2002), available at http://www3.hants.gov.uk/forced_migration.pdf.
89. Patrick L. Schmidt, The Process and Prospects for the U.N. Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement to Become Customary International Law: A Preliminary
Assessment, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 483, 489 (2004).
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called on Dr. Francis Deng, Representative of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral on Internally Displaced Persons, to develop a new international
framework for IDPs.90 Dr. Deng’s work on an international mandate was
framed in the realization that IDPs assistance falls under state
sovereignty, because the recipients of aid are by definition internal.91 In
order to confront the sensitive issue of state sovereignty,92 Dr. Deng
chose to “approach sovereignty not as a negative concept by which states
barricade themselves against international scrutiny and involvement, but
rather as a positive concept entailing responsibility for the protection and
general welfare of the citizens and of those falling under state
jurisdiction.”93 In 1998, the United Nations adopted Dr. Deng’s
proposed mandate, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
(Guiding Principles), which serves as the sole international document
directly addressing the unique plight of people displaced within their
own nation’s borders.94 While the Guiding Principles “reflect and are
consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law and
analogous refugee law,”95 the document lacks binding force on state

90. Id. at 483.
91. Francis Mading Deng, The Global Challenge of Internal Displacement, 5 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 141, 143-44 (2001).
92. Deng argues that states may be forced to give up state sovereignty for the
protection of their citizens:
Under normal circumstances, states are expected to, and do in fact, discharge those
responsibilities [for the protection and general welfare of the citizens and those
falling under state jurisdiction]. If they cannot discharge those responsibilities for
lack of capacity or resources, they are expected to seek, or at least welcome,
international assistance. If, on the other hand, they fail to meet their obligations or
fail to welcome international assistance, and masses of their people suffer
humanitarian and human rights tragedies as a result, then they must expect the
international community to show concern and perhaps even threaten intervention.
Such intervention could range from persuasive diplomatic intercession, to more
assertive political and economic measures in the form of sanctions, to coercive
military intervention, in extreme cases. It is obvious, therefore, that the best way
to guarantee state sovereignty is to discharge the responsibilities of sovereignty
towards the citizens and those under state jurisdiction.
Id. at 144-45.
93. Id. at 144.
94. Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the
Commission on Human Rights, Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, U.N. ESCOR,
Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., ¶¶ 9-10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2
(1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement].
95. Id. ¶ 9.
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actors.96 Nonetheless, the thirty principles serve as “valuable practicable
guidance
to
Governments,
other
competent
authorities,
intergovernmental organizations and NGOs in their work with internally
displaced persons.”97
Similar to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Guiding Principles are
not suited to effectively deal with the particular issues of rising sea level
displacement. The Guiding Principles define IDPs as:
[P]ersons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged
to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized State border.98
On first examination of the IDP definition, people displaced due to
rising sea level may fit within the definition’s limitations. According to
the definition, a displaced person is protected if he or she must move
because of “natural or human made disasters.” While the Guiding
Principles do not provide a definition for “disaster,” common use
suggests a sudden event.99 Accordingly, the United Nations Refugee
Agency has referred to the following events as “natural disasters” that
served as catalysts for internal displacement: the 2004 tsunami in the
Indian Ocean, the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, and the 2008 cyclone in
Myanmar.100 The tsunami, earthquake, and cyclone are easily described
as sudden, disastrous events that immediately produced IDPs due to the
quick destruction of homes. Rising sea level could be considered a
gradual and sudden disaster. While rising sea level is a gradual
occurrence, coastal regions that experience a gradual rise in sea level are

96. Deng, supra note 91, at 147. “[‘The Guiding Principles’] aim is to provide
practical guidance to all those with a role in addressing the plight of the internally
displaced. The idea was that, as a restatement of existing legal norms, the Guiding
Principles would provide only guidelines for application with a focus on internal
displacement and would not require formal adoption by the relevant UN agencies.” Id.
97. U.N. Refugee Agency, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introductory
Note (2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.html.
98. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 94, Annex, ¶ 2.
99. Webster’s Dictionary defines “disaster” as “2 a) a sudden calamitous event
producing great material damage, loss, and distress; b) a sudden or great misfortune; c) a
complete failure.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 643 (3d. ed.
1993).
100. U.N. Refugee Agency, Internally Displaced People: On the Rise in Their Own
Land, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
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more vulnerable to sudden, frequent, and detrimental flooding.101
Therefore, a rise in sea level could be interpreted as a human made
disaster under the IDP definition.
The Guiding Principles call for protections for IDPs, like the “right
to an adequate standard of living”102 and unimpeded access to “the
medical care and attention they require, without distinction on any
grounds other than medical ones,”103 that are blanketed in a general right
of equality and dignity.
Although the Guiding Principles provide
nations with a blueprint outlining guaranteed rights and protection of
IDPs, they lack a principle addressing international assistance in times of
“natural or human made disasters.” In fact, Guiding Principle 3 places
responsibility on the home state to provide assistance and protection to
the internally displaced: “[n]ational authorities have the primary duty and
responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to
internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.”104 The document
fails to confer an international duty to protect people who are displaced
within their own borders;105 home states are charged with “facilitating
durable solutions for their displacement.”106 Climate change-induced sea
level rise is a global problem. IDPs’ respective home states are not the
only contributors to the natural disaster that is causing displacement.
Therefore, the burden to assist and protect IDPs should not rest solely on
the shoulders of their national authorities. With the inclusion of
Principle 3, the Guiding Principles do not serve as the adequate and
necessary response for displacement caused by rising sea level.
D. Proposed Funding Mechanisms
Academics have coupled their efforts to redefine “refugee” and
“IDP” with proposals to mitigate and assist the migration. For example,
Docherty and Giannini proposed “a new legal instrument” that would
“create obligations to deal with both prevention and remediation of the
climate change refugee problem.”107 They argue for the adoption of an
independent convention, separate from the 1951 Refugee Convention or
101. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 334.
102. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 94, principle 18.
103. Id. principle 19.
104. Id. principle 3.
105. BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 18.
106. Elizabeth Ferris, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Inst., Displacement,
Natural Disaster, and Human Rights (Oct. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/1017_natural_disasters_ferris.aspx.
107. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 350.
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the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which
would accomplish three goals:
First, the instrument should establish guarantees of human rights
protections and humanitarian aid for a specific class of people.
Second, it should spread the burden of fulfilling those guarantees
across the home state, host state, and international community.
Finally, it should form institutions to implement the provisions,
including a global fund, a coordinating agency, and a body of
scientific experts.108
Stressing the belief that “there are legal and moral reasons to hold
those who contributed most to causing the harm responsible for
mitigating it,”109 Docherty and Giannini proposed a global fund
consisting of in-kind financial assistance from the international
community.110 Specifically, the global fund would administer and
manage the international financial assistance.111 Docherty and Giannini
argue that the global community will be better able to harness the
emerging issue of climate change refugees by “pooling all states’
resources” with the greater financial burden falling on developed nations
that have contributed the most to the current warming of the globe.112
In comparison to Docherty and Giannini’s proposed “new legal
instrument” and accompanying global fund, Biermann and Boas
proposed adopting a protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)113 called the “Recognition,
Protection and Resettlement of Climate Refugees.”114 This protocol
would be grounded in the following five principles: planned relocation
and resettlement, resettlement instead of temporary asylum, collective
108. Id.
109. Id. at 382.
110. Id. at 350, 379.
111. Id. at 385.
112. Id. at 382.
113. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is an international
treaty created to address and combat climate change. The UNFCCC entered into force on
March 21, 1994, and is ratified by 192 countries. Under UNFCCC, governments:
“gather and share information on greenhouse gas emissions, national policies and best
practices; launch national strategies for addressing greenhouse gas emissions and
adapting to expected impacts, including the provision of financial and technological
support to developing countries; cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of
climate change.” U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/2627.php (last visited Aug. 27,
2010).
114. BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 26.

228

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:1

rights for local populations, international assistance for domestic
measures, and international burden-sharing.115 In order to achieve the
five principles, extensive funding is necessary. Biermann and Boas
suggest that the appropriate funding apparatus is a separate fund
dedicated to the particular needs of climate refugees.116 The proposed
Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund would be entirely
grant-based.117 To that end, if “larger development projects financed
through loans include the resettlement of climate refugees, the particular
costs of the resettlement elements will be fully reimbursed as a grant.”118
In order to avoid rivalry with “other sustainable development needs” in
the UNFCCC,119 the Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund
would be funded by new and additional capital.120 Developing countries
that incur costs to protect and relocate climate change refugees due to sea
level rise will receive reimbursement for their incremental costs through
the Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund.121 The proposed
UNFCCC Protocol on Recognition, Protection and Resettlement of
Climate Refugees will provide its member parties or affiliated
committees with the authority to create and manage “a list of designated
populations as ‘climate refugees in need of relocation,’” in order to
properly “determine the amount of reimbursement and type of assistance,
and to take all other measures related to the governance of the fund.”122
Though academics have different approaches, the proposals
discussed above find common ground in the belief that rising sea level
and displacement are global problems that require committed
115. Id. at 25-26.
116. Id. at 29.
117. Id. at 30.
118. Id.
119. The UNFCCC has already established a funding mechanism that manages and
distributes financial assistance to developing countries combating the effects of climate
change. The Special Climate Change Fund was created in 2001, and finances
“[a]daptation, . . . [t]ransfer of technologies, . . . [e]nergy, transport, industry, agriculture,
forestry and waste management . . . [and] [a]ctivities to assist developing country Parties .
. . in diversifying their economies . . . .” U.N. FRAMEWORK CONV. ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
Report on the Conference of the Parties of the Seventh Session Held at Marrakesh From
29 October to 10 November 2001, 44, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21,
2002),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/special_climate_change_
fund/items/3657.php.
120. BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 30.
121. Id. Additionally, a “large part of th[is] financial transfer will be channelled
through international relief agencies and . . . these agencies will then be entitled to
reclaim their costs” from the fund. Id.
122. Id.
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international cooperation to truly combat their effects.
This
understanding of the global nature of the problem is reflected in
emerging international efforts to set guidelines for climate change
prevention. The most recent attempt to reach international agreement
occurred at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen, Denmark.
PART IV: THE COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE
From December 7, 2009 to December 18, 2009, delegates from 193
countries met in Copenhagen, Denmark, for a United Nations summit on
climate change. The Copenhagen Conference was charged with the task
of developing a new international agreement to be implemented after the
expiration of the Kyoto Protocol123 in 2012.124 The delegates endeavored
to unify nations in constructive steps that would collectively combat the
current effects of global warming and preempt future harms.125
123. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force Feb. 16,
2005). The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement that:
[S]ets binding targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European community
for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. . . . Recognizing that developed
countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions
in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, the
Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of
“common but differentiated responsibilities.”
(Nov.
19,
2010,
2:15
PM),
Kyoto
Protocol,
UNFCCC
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. The United States is a signatory of the
Kyoto Protocol, but has never ratified the international agreement. See UNFCCC, Kyoto
Protocol:
Status
of
Ratification
(2009),
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratificatio
n_20091203.pdf.
124. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Fact Sheet: 10
Frequently Asked Questions About the Copenhagen Deal 1 (2009),
http://unfccc.int/files/press/fact_sheets/application/pdf/10_faqs_copenhagen_deal.pdf
(last updated November 2009).
125. Specifically, there are four key issues the delegates at the Copenhagen Conference
needed to provide clarity for:
The [sic] first is clarity on the mid-term emission reduction targets that
industrialized countries will commit to. Second, there must be clarity on the
actions that developing countries could undertake to limit their greenhouse gas
emissions. Third, it must define stable and predictable financing to help the
developing world reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the inevitable
effects of climate. And finally, it must identify institutions that will allow
technology and finance to be deployed in a way that treats the developing
countries as equal partners in the decision-making process.
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Unfortunately, establishing an amalgamated voice that incorporates
diverse interests and needs is a difficult task. The Copenhagen
Conference was weighed down with contentious talks that exemplified
the immense difficulty “to forge consensus among the disparate blocs of
countries fighting over environmental guilt, future costs and who should
referee the results.”126
Many delegates from developing nations, the most vulnerable to
climate change, were not included in negotiations between highly
developed and influential countries, such as the United States, China, and
India.127 Small island nations attended the Copenhagen Conference as a
united front to advocate for their citizens who are losing their homes and
livelihood to rising sea level. During a panel entitled “Sinking Islands,
the Pacific Voice,” a delegate from the Solomon Islands described the
struggles climate change refugees face and stressed the need for support
from developed nations. She emphatically stated:
Increasing sea level rise, unpredictable weather, increasing
temperature—any of which describe climate change—but for
me, climate change is losing my island. Today, I witnessed
washing away of my shoreline, my island slowly sinking.
Today, I witnessed culture threat. Today, I witnessed people of
my island moving to another island . . . . Sea level rise is forcing
my people to migrate . . . . My question today is can the world
leaders support our leaders, because that is where our survival
lies.128
Repeatedly, delegates from Papa New Guinea, Tonga, Republic of
Palau, and other low-lying island nations stressed the urgency for
assistance in the face of rising sea level. To illustrate the pending
upheaval, the President of Palau described the rising sea level as a
“tsunami moving in slow motion vertically from the bottom up to
Id.
126. Andrew C. Revkin & John M. Broder, A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/
earth/20accord.html?scp=1&sq=a%20grudging%20accord%20in%20climate%20talks&s
t=cse.
127. John M. Broder, Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations’ Climate Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/
earth/19climate.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Many%20goals%20remain%20unmet%20in%20
5%20nations’%20climate%20deal&st=cse.
128. Webcast: United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, “Sinking
Islands, the Pacific Voice – 1.5 to stay alive,” held by the United Nations (Dec. 7-19,
2009),
http://webcast.cop15.dk/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=
2583&theme=cop15.
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eventually swallow the low-lying islands which will be forever washed
out from the face of the earth.”129 Despite the numerous pleas for
international assistance, the Copenhagen Conference concluded without
the delegates committing to a legally binding international agreement.
Instead, the outcome of the Conference was the Copenhagen Accord,130
an agreement that Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon described as “the first
truly global agreement that will limit and reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, support adaptation for the most vulnerable and launch a new
era of green growth.”131
Participating nations recognized the
Copenhagen Accord by consensus,132 but failed to make it a binding
international treaty with the ability to enforce the terms agreed to at the
conference.133 Some delegates were “disappointed that the . . . [Accord]
lacked so many elements they considered crucial, including firm targets
for mid- or long-term reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and a
deadline for concluding a binding treaty next year.”134 However, as U.S.
President Barack Obama noted, “for the first time in history all major
economies have come together to accept their responsibility to take
action to confront the threat of climate change,”135 a fact that should not
be lost amidst the disappointment over the Accord’s shortcomings.
Despite the concerns that the Copenhagen Accord lacks teeth,
developed nations did pledge financial support to a fund which will assist
developing nations in their efforts to address the effects of climate
change.136 The Copenhagen Accord states:

129. Webcast: United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, “LAST
CHANCE! Pacific island leaders call to keep us alive!,” held by the United Nations (Dec.
7-19,
2009),
http://webcast.cop15.dk/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kong
resssession=2625&theme=cop15.
130. Copenhagen Accord, opened for signature Dec. 12, 2009, ___ U.N.T.S. ____,
available at http://www.denmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/C41B62AB-4688-4ACE-BB7BF6D2C8AAEC20/0/copenhagen_accord.pdf.
131. Climate change deal marks an ‘essential beginning,’ Ban says, UN NEWS
SERVICE, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=33305.
132. Id.
133. James Kanter, Copenhagen’s One Real Accomplishment: Getting Some Money
Flowing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/12/21/business/energy-environment/21ihtgreen21.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Copenhagen’s%20one%20real%20accomplishment&st=
cse.
134. Revkin & Broder, supra note 126.
135. Obama’s Remarks on the Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/earth/19climate.text.html?_r=1
&scp=1&sq=Obama’s%20Remarks%20on%20the%20Climate%20Agreeemnt&st=cse.
136. Kanter, supra note 133.
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[T]he collective commitment by developed countries to provide
new and additional resources, including forestry and investments
through international institutions, approaching USD 30 billion
for the period 2010-2012 with balanced allocation between
adaptation and mitigation . . . In the context of meaningful
mitigation actions and transparency on implementation,
developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD
100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of
developed countries.137
The Copenhagen Accord calls for the establishment of the
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, which will serve as an “operating
entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects,
programme, policies and other activities in developing countries related
to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity-building,
technology development and transfer.”138 Notably, the pledged financial
support signifies recognition from developed nations that financial
capital needs to be dedicated to developing nations, who have
contributed least to the global warming catastrophe, and yet, have
suffered the most.139 Who will receive the funds, how the funds will be
allocated to the varying climate change issues, and the structure of
reporting systems has not been determined.140
A. Allocation of Funds for Climate Change Displacement
The United Nations and the signatories of the Copenhagen Accord
intend for financial support to be distributed to developing nations within
the year. The Copenhagen Accord calls for a “fast-start” fund valued at
$10 billion annually that is to be dispersed from 2010 to 2012, before
$100 billion is contributed annually by 2020.141 In line with this goal, the
United Nations commenced a high level panel,142 the Advisory Group on
Climate Change Financing, to “design and oversee a $100 billion annual
fund for climate mitigation and adaptation financing in poor

137.
138.
139.
140.
131.
141.
142.

Copenhagen Accord, supra note 130, ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 10.
Revkin & Broder, supra note 126.
See Climate Change deal marks an ‘essential beginning,’ Ban says, supra note
Kanter, supra note 133.
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 130, ¶ 9.
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countries.”143 In determining the allocation of financial resources from
the Green Climate Fund, the Advisory Group on Climate Change
Financing must ensure that a significant portion of the financial support
is dedicated to preventing and mitigating human displacement caused by
rising sea level.
As discussed earlier, climate change refugees144 are not bestowed
legal protection and assistance under refugee and IDP law. Until there is
an internationally recognized definition of climate change refugee, and
possibly a new United Nations Convention that focuses on this
population’s unique needs, financial assistance must be derived from a
different international funding mechanism.
As echoed by the
Copenhagen Conference panelists from the Pacific island nations that are
facing total envelopment,145 the dire situation requires immediate
international cooperation and response.
Thus, the international
community must utilize the current climate change mitigation funding
mechanism, the Copenhagen Accord, to confront sea level rise
displacement. As discussed in Part III, Section C, theorists and
academics argue that the appropriate funding mechanism must embrace
the principle of international burden sharing, because “[c]limate change
is a global problem in causation and consequences, and the industrialized
countries bear most of the moral responsibility for its victims.”146 The
Copenhagen Accord reflects this principle when it emphasizes that the
effort to combat climate change must be made “in accordance with the

143. Nathanial Gronewold, U.N. Gets Rolling on Copenhagen Accord, Forms Finance
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/
2010/02/12/12greenwire-un-gets-rolling-on-copenhagen-accord-forms-fin-88171.html?
scp=1&sq=U.N.%20Gets%20Rolling%20on%20Copenhagen%20Accord&st=cse.
144. I use the term “climate change refugee” with the understanding, as discussed in
Section III, that there is not a universally agreed-upon definition. Effectively, for the
remainder of this paper, I adopt the definition provided by Biermann and Boas, which is
as follows: “people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future,
because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least
one of the three impacts of climate change: sea level rise, extreme weather events, and
water scarcity.” Biermann and Boas, supra note 81, at 8.
145. Webcast: United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, “Sinking
islands, the Pacific Voice – 1.5 to stay alive,” held by the United Nations (Dec. 7-19,
2009),
http://webcast.cop15.dk/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=
2583&theme=cop15; Webcast: United Nations Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen, “LAST CHANCE! Pacific island leaders call to keep us alive!” held by the
United Nations (Dec. 7-19, 2009), http://webcast.cop15.dk/kongresse/cop15/
templ/play.php?id_kongress session=2625& theme =cop15.
146. BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 26.
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principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities.”147
Beyond the articulation of an international burden sharing principle,
the Copenhagen Accord contains the concrete objective of “stabiliz[ing]
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere,” which would require a
global temperature rise of less than two degrees Celsius.148 Allocating
financial resources to developing nations to specifically confront human
displacement from sea level rise is crucial to satisfying the Copenhagen
Accord’s objectives of capping global temperature rise and implementing
adaptation actions to reduce vulnerability and build resilience in
developing nations. The following factors support the argument that
combating the negative effects of climate change requires mitigation and
protection of climate change refugees: security and conflict, exasperation
of environmental issues in host and home countries, and cultural
survival.
a. Security and Conflict
As people are forced to relocate within their home country or cross
borders to seek refuge in host countries, risk to security and violent
conflict is heightened.149
Though empirical studies are lacking,
academics predict that “climate-related stresses will increase competition
between groups for increasingly scarce resources, in turn raising the
potential for violent conflict and refugee movements.”150 Developing
countries, like Bangladesh and Vietnam, endure on limited resources as
is; climate change refugees are expected “to put even further strains on
scarce water, energy and food resources.”151 To make matters worse, in
Bangladesh, rise in sea level is anticipated to wipe out vital cultivated
land, with “rice production . . . expected to drop 10 percent and wheat
production by 30 percent” by 2050.152 Moreover, human sustenance, may
be challenged as individuals who previously relied for nourishment on
147. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 130, ¶ 1.
148. Id.
149. JON BARNETT & NEIL ADGER, SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: TOWARDS AN
IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING, HUMAN SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, AN
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP, 2 (June 20-21, 2005), http://www.gechs.org/
downloads/holmen/Barnett_Adger.pdf.
150. McLeman, supra note 78, at 9-10.
151. Joanna Kakissis, Environmental Refugees Unable to Return Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/world/asia/
04migrants.html.
152. Friedman, supra note 3.
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the bounty from the sea are forced to look inland after the coastal land is
eroded or disappears, thus altering the allocation of natural resources.
Natural resources induced conflict is not a new phenomenon, as
exemplified by violence motivated by dwindling oil resources.153
Developing countries, which will primarily serve as home or host
countries to individuals displaced by rising sea level, have less adaptive
capacity to deal with the influx of population.154 A developing country’s
ability to provide state entitlements or services will be challenged due to
the lack of financial resources available to adapt to the changing
demographics. Serving the needs of displaced individuals will put an
additional strain on the home or host country, which could “tip poor
countries into fragile states and fragile states into failed states.”155 In
“Security and Climate Change: Towards an Improved Understanding,”
Barnett and Adger argue that “a common factor in many internal wars is
that armed groups are comprised of young men whose expectations for a
better life have been frustrated due to contractions in their livelihood.”156
An individual’s choice to take up arms may be a response to sudden
poverty coupled with a real or perceived insecurity of the future.157
For the displaced who cross national borders, Myers notes in remarks
entitled “Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue” that
there are “limits to host countries’ capacity, let alone willingness to take
in outsiders.”158 Refugees frequently face hostility in host countries as
they can be viewed as “threat[ening] social cohesion and national
identity,” thus becoming “an excuse for outbreaks of ethnic tension and
civil disorder, even political upheaval.”159 Castles argues that “forced
movements of population are increasingly perceived as a major factor in
generating conflicts between states and the use of force.” 160 To combat
153. NIGEL PURVIS & JOSHUA BUSBY, BROOKINGS INST., THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
CLIMATE CHANGE FOR THE UN SYSTEM (2004), http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/rc/papers/2004/05energy_purvis/purvis20040501.pdf.
154. See IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 317.
155. Oli Brown & Robert McLeman, A Recurring Anarchy? The Emergence of Climate
Change as a Threat to International Peace and Security, CONFLICT, SECURITY, AND
DEVELOPMENT, Oct., 2009, at 293, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/
recurring_anarchy_climate.pdf.
156. Barnett & Adger, supra note 149, at 5.
157. Id. at 6.
158. Myers, supra note 79, at 3.
159. Id. Myers cites Haitians in the United States and North Africans in Europe to
illustrate a host country’s hostility towards nonresidents seeking refuge, regardless of the
reason. Id.
160. CASTLES, supra note 88, at 6. Castles supports his argument by citing that “many
of the international military interventions of recent years have had the prevention of
OF
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the steady flood of climate change refugees from Bangladesh, India is
“building a fence much like the one along the U.S.-Mexico border to
keep illegal immigrants out.”161 In sum, the possibility for security risk
and conflict will increase as populations are displaced by sea level rise
and seek refuge in new locations. As a result, the collective objectives of
the Copenhagen Accord will be hindered by amplified armed conflict
and security issues within and across nation state borders.
b. Exasperation of Environmental Issues
As sea level rises, residents of coastal communities will gradually
move inland as their land is eroded, disappears, or can no longer be
cultivated. The resulting food and water scarcity “will accelerate the
dramatic rural-urban drift in the developing world” as climate change
refugees travel to cities to find new job opportunities and livelihoods.162
In vulnerable Bangladesh, many climate change refugees may move to
the mega-city of Dhaka, where 3.4 million people already live in
slums.163 Dhaka, a city that is already “bursting at the seams,” will swell
even more with the inundation from climate change refugees.164 Not
only will the new urban residents be vying for scarce resources in Dhaka,
but the influx of people will also contribute to the mega city’s negative
environmental impact. Currently, “cities draw together many of Earth’s
major environmental problems: population growth, pollution, resource
degradation and waste generation.”165 If cities, like Dhaka, are not
equipped to accept and mitigate the prospective population increase due
to the rise in sea level, the cities’ current environmental problems will be

refugee flows as one of their main objectives.” Castles provides examples such as the
“‘safe haven’ for Kurds in Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, the US intervention in Haiti
in 1994, and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.” Id.
161. Friedman, supra note 3.
162. BROWN, supra note 4, at 32. In the last fifty years, approximately 800 million
people have migrated from rural dwellings to urban dwellings. This movement has
primarily impacted the developing world. Lisa R. Pruitt, Migration, Development, and
the Promise of CEDAW for Rural Women, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 707, 710-11 (2009).
163. See The World Bank, South Asian Population, Urban Growth: A Challenge and
an Opportunity (Oct. 19, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21393869~pagePK:1467
36~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html#example.
164. Friedman, supra note 3.
165. U.N. POPULATION FUND, STATE OF THE WORLD POPULATION 2007: UNLEASHING
THE POTENTIAL FOR URBAN GROWTH 55 (2007) http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/
english/chapter_5/print/chapter_5.html.
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exasperated, thus working against the objectives of the Copenhagen
Accord.
c. Cultural Survival
The envelopment of small island nations is accompanied by the
potential loss of cultures. At the Copenhagen Conference, delegates from
small Pacific islands described their expectation of total loss of their
island nations if swift action was not taken to combat climate change.166
Specifically, a student delegate from the Solomon Islands spoke of the
anticipated loss of her culture and people if the international community
fails to act urgently and with purpose.167 The survival of all cultures is
intrinsically valuable to the global community. While there may not be a
direct link between the endurance of cultures and the Copenhagen
Accord’s ultimate objective of “stabiliz[ing] greenhouse gas
concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system,”168 the international
agreement will fail if cultures are allowed to dissipate with the loss of
coastal land.
PART V: CONCLUSION
Climate change-induced rising sea level is a reality for low-lying
coastal communities and islands. Millions of coastal residents in
developing countries will be forced to seek livelihoods in new
communities within their country’s borders or beyond. Due to the lack
of an internationally recognized definition and funding mechanism,
climate change refugees currently face, and will continue to face, forced
migration without legal protection and financial assistance. Confronted
with this dire situation, the international community must act urgently to
prevent and mitigate the displacement of millions of vulnerable climate
change refugees. The developed nations’ pledged funds in the
Copenhagen Accord should be allocated to serve this pending upheaval.
The Copenhagen Accord is not perfect. Although over 120 countries
have agreed to the Accord, it remains legally unenforceable. In the long
term, $100 billion will probably fall short of the capital needed to truly
combat the myriad effects of climate change. Despite these problems,
166. Webcast: United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, supra note
145.
167. Id.
168. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 130, at ¶ 1.
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the international community, through the Copenhagen Accord, has
acknowledged that climate change requires a global response that reflects
the appropriate burden-sharing among nations. In turn, the international
community must utilize its financial resources to combat the pending
forced migration of millions of climate change refugees.

